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Abstract 
Constitutional reform is a tedious process that requires long periods of time, a relatively broad 
consensus among the political actors, and often needs popular approval. In spite of these, Romania 
changed its constitution once (2003) and witnessed several unsuccessful revisions. The most recent 
attempt, in 2013, has introduced the deliberative dimension in the form of a constitutional forum. This 
article investigates the legitimacy of this deliberative practice using a tri-dimensional approach: input, 
throughput, and output legitimacy. Our qualitative study relying on direct observation and secondary 
data analysis concludes that while input and throughput legitimacy were achieved to great extent, the 
output legitimacy was low. 
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Introduction 
The adoption of new constitutions in the beginning of the 1990s has been among the first 
institutional reforms undertaken in Eastern Europe after regime change. Setting the rules of 
the game was equally important to countries embarking on their paths to democratization and 
to constituent republics resulted after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, or 
Yugoslavia (Elster 1991; 1993). However, this extensive wave of constitution writing or 
rewriting1 had rarely produced long-lasting documents. Drafted under the influence of the 
previous regime’s legacies they could hardly anticipate the rapid structural changes and 
various types of challenges (political, economic and social). For example, as a response to the 
1 Usually the rewriting meant a substantial revision of the constitutions adopted during communism. For example, 
Hungary revised in 1989 to a great extent the 1949 constitution and introduced nine amendments one year later. 
For details, see (Pogany 1993). 
2 
authoritarian past, many constitutions placed emphasis on sovereignty and independence 
(especially in the post-Soviet region), and were against the transfer of powers to international 
organizations. One decade later, when some of the East European countries initiated the 
process of accession to the European Union (EU), such provisions had to be altered 
(Kellermann, de Zwaan, and Czuczai 2001; Albi 2005). In addition to external constraints, other 
constitutional reforms were made to support democracy, to improve the functioning of 
institutions and to increase the legitimacy of post-communist regimes. All these resulted in a 
dynamic process of constitutional changes for more than two decades (Ginsburg and Dixon 
2011). 
Romania is an illustrative case of this dynamic with respect to the number, content and 
procedure of constitutional revision. In almost 25 years of post-communism the country 
initiated several procedures to amend its fundamental act, adopted in 1991. The only 
successful revision took place in 2003 and was driven by the country’s process of EU accession. 
The main changes targeted the introduction of articles related to the EU and NATO accession, 
the right of EU citizens living in Romania to vote in local and European elections, removed the 
obligation for conscription, and included a series of political and administrative reforms 
(including the extension of country president’s term in office to five years). It was a top-down 
approach triggered by the general consensus among political elites regarding the necessity for 
constitutional change. The reform was approved in a binding referendum that had to meet a 
50% participation quorum. The more recent revision was scheduled 10 years later and 
envisaged mainly as effect of the major institutional problems visible throughout the years 
(Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013). Although emerged in the circle of political elites, the 2013 
initiative to revise the constitution made recourse to popular participation. The consultative 
tool designed to crowd-source the constitutional amendments was suggestively called 
Constitutional Forum and was coordinated by one of the largest non-governmental 
organization (NGO) in the country: Pro Democracy Association.2 In essence, the Forum sought 
2 The idea of such a Forum is not new in Romania: the 2003 constitutional reform was preceded by a similar forum 
in 2002 but the attempt lacked visibility and political support, while people’s participation was limited. Back then 
the involvement of civil society in changing the constitution was compromised by the absence of dialogue and 
cooperation between the government and the civil society representatives and experts. 
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to organize meetings with citizens throughout the country and gather their suggestions for 
constitutional revision. While the part of the process involving consultations was over, the 
entire initiative has been interrupted at the beginning of 2014 due to the departure from 
government of the main supporter, i.e. the National Liberal Party (PNL).  
The 2013 initiative deserves attention for at least two reasons. First, it emerged in the 
context of changing civic engagement in Romania. For more than one decade after the regime 
change the civil society was generally weak, highly dependent on donor funds, and with low 
capacity to mobilize attention from international community (Howard 2003; Bădescu, Sum, 
and Uslaner 2004; Carey 2004; Nicholson of Winterbourne 2006). Starting with the EU 
accession of the country and continuing later with the hard times during the financial crisis in 
Europe, civil society gained strength and citizens’ activism increased significantly (Parau 2009; 
Burean and Badescu 2014). As a part of this recent development, constitutionalism was taken 
beyond the state and civil society was asked to provide input. While the reasons for such a 
decision from the political elites can be contextual, the entire process is worth a closer look. 
Second, it is one of the few deliberative constitutional revisions in Europe. In this sense, while 
deliberations in Iceland and Ireland received high attention and coverage, the Romanian case 
remains under-studied. Its investigation may reveal particular approaches to the issue of 
constitutional deliberation that could be used in further studies. Following these arguments, 
our article analyzes the Constitutional Forum in 2013 as an example of deliberative practice 
and assesses its legitimacy according to criteria outlined in the literature. To this end, the 
qualitative analysis combines direct participatory observation (one of the authors was the 
Forum’s local coordinator) and desk research. The findings of our study complement and 
nuance the conclusion reached by Blokker (2014) that the recourse to the people serves an 
instrumental purpose being more apparent than real and thus rarely meets the requirements 
of normative democratic theory.  
The first section presents the theoretical linkage between constitutional change and 
deliberative practice. It also reviews the literature on legitimacy and outlines the framework 
used for analysis with an emphasis on three dimensions: input, throughput, and output 
legitimacy. Next, we describe the reasons for constitutional change in Romania and briefly 
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introduce the key features of the deliberative Constitutional Forum in 2013. The third section 
analyzes the extent to which the Forum deliberations met the dimensions of legitimacy. The 
conclusion summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications. 
Constitutional Change, Deliberative Democracy, and Legitimacy 
A constitution fulfils key legal and political functions in a state. From a legal perspective, it is 
conceived as the supreme norm that frames and shapes ordinary law making. In providing the 
preconditions for democracy, i.e. conditions to be met before majoritarian decision-making 
(Dworkin 1995; Blokker 2014), the constitution acts like a buffer zone that isolates the 
contextual factors (e.g. a specific parliamentary majority, the personalization of power) and 
does not allow them to interfere with the democratic principles. On political grounds, it sets 
the broad principles for political decision-making by means of establishing the functions of 
institutions, rights and duties of citizens, and limits to the interference of the state in areas of 
private life (Freeman 1990; Ackerman 1993; Dworkin 1995). Constitutions can fulfil these 
crucial functions only if they are respected.  
Following this line of thought, the fundamental law, i.e. the constitution, must be 
forged through procedures that ensure the broad participation of citizens, the subjects whose 
basic rights are directly affected by it (Fossum and Menendez 2005). There is a consensus in 
the literature that the best form of popular involvement in constitutional design is through 
deliberation. The essence of deliberation can be summarized as “producing reasonable, well-
informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, 
new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers 2003, 309). This brief 
definition outlines the set of procedural conditions to be met by participants engaged in 
deliberation that makes it much more than simple discussion: inclusiveness, communication, 
and the willingness to be persuaded and change pre-formed preferences in the face of a better 
argument (Gutmann and Thompson 1998; Dryzek 2000). Deliberation as the most adequate 
procedure leading to a well-ordered constitutional democracy has been endorsed by Rawls 
(1999) who placed at the core of his argument the conception of public reason. The role of 
public debate and scrutiny in constitution-making has been also emphasized by Habermas 
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(1996; 2001) who argued that its legitimacy stemmed from rich quality debates before taking a 
decision. The discussions that take place in the public sphere based in civil society have the 
capacity to legitimize the institutional will-formation and to translate citizen opinions into 
good political outcomes (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015). Along these lines, the notion of 
popular constitutionalism presupposes an active role of the citizens in shaping the constitution 
in the sense of (re)gaining its popular foundations and willingness of the people to prevail 
(Ackerman 1993; Thomas 2008).  
Evidence from the last decade reveals the existence of a real turn in the direction of 
deliberation. In their attempt to apply these normative conceptions a number of European 
countries has recently used deliberative democracy to reform their constitutions. Two of the 
well-known examples are those of Iceland and Ireland. Iceland had an inclusive constitution 
revision that included two national forums of 950 and 1,500 randomly selected people, a 
constitutional assembly of 25 people, and a non-binding national referendum (Olafson 2011; 
Filmore-Patrick 2013; Landemore 2013). Ireland established a Constitutional Convention – with 
the first working session at the beginning of 2013 – that included ordinary citizens and elected 
politicians as equal members.  
Assessing the Legitimacy of Deliberation 
In his study about the general concept of EU legitimacy, Scharpf (1999) differentiates between 
input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the citizens’ political participation and 
representation, while output legitimacy reflects the institutional performance to govern 
effectively for the people (i.e. problem-solving). A third dimension of legitimacy, namely 
throughput, has been recently added by Schmidt (2013) who argued that this is essential to 
understand what happens between input and output legitimacy. With an emphasis on 
procedures, this dimension aims to capture mechanisms such as accountability, transparency, 
openness and inclusiveness of the governance process. This additional dimension is in line with 
the conceptions at the core of deliberative democracy. The central argument here is that 
outcomes are legitimate not only when they involve all those who are affected by them 
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(Habermas 2001; Dryzek 2001; Fossum and Menendez 2005)3, but also if the way in which this 
involvement happens guarantees substantial participation and equal access to the final 
decision. As a result, all three components – input, throughput and output legitimacy – are 
important for the legitimacy evaluation of a constitutional deliberative practice. Let us identify 
the ways in which an assessment can be made for each of them. 
 Input legitimacy focuses on the nature of participation and representation. In this 
respect, a crucial component is the inclusiveness of participation. While not all subjects can 
take part, it is important that members of different groups in society are reached and provided 
equal access to deliberative procedures (Young 2000; Geissel 2013). This idea is usually 
implemented in the form of grassroots participation complemented by (at least partial) 
random sampling. Such procedures are meant to create the linkage between the mini-public 
(those who participate in deliberation) and maxi-public (the entire citizenry). In principle, the 
diversity of people is likely to produce a diversity of opinions but will also ensure that no 
relevant groups are excluded from discussions. Equally important to the issue of who 
participates is the mandate of the deliberative practice. It is relevant to know how broad is the 
scope of action (i.e. what can participants decide upon) and what form it can take. The 
dynamics of the constitutional deliberative practice can be influenced by the way in which the 
agenda is set and by the possibilities people have to change it. There is a major difference 
between an open agenda where people can discuss and decide about the vast majority of 
issues and a closed agenda where institution sets clear imitations to what people can discuss 
and decide (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015; Suiter and Reuchamps 2015). 
Throughput legitimacy reflects the concerns of input legitimacy from a procedural 
perspective. Inclusive representation and equal access to participation are not sufficient if they 
do not take place in a substantial manner, i.e. equal voice to all participants. While fairness of 
representation can be ensured through random selection and / or stakeholder inclusion, the 
equal voice is guaranteed by the mechanisms of deliberation, e.g. small groups, group 
composition, moderators (Smith 2009). This notion broadly corresponds to that of popular 
                                                          
3 This formulation should not be taken ad literam because, with the exception of small communities, the 
deliberation of all those subject to a decision is not possible (Goodin 2000). This is precisely why Dryzek (2001) 
argues that part of the output legitimacy is the justification of outcome to those who were not directly involved.  
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control from the literature on democratic innovations and refers to the meaningful 
participation of citizens at different stages of the decision-making process (Geissel 2013). The 
transparency of the deliberative process is a crucial element for reasons related to internal and 
external dynamic (Smith 2009; Talpin 2012; Schmidt 2013). First, it guarantees the openness of 
procedures and communication between participants who become aware about the rules of 
the game, how far deliberation can go, and what the role of moderators is. Second, 
transparency makes smoother the linkage between the participants involved in deliberation 
and the broader public. The latter will be more likely to accept an outcome (see output 
legitimacy below) if they are familiar with procedural aspects related to the mini-public 
involved in deliberation (e.g. its structure, agenda, how decision is taken etc.). Transparency – 
and the related dimension of publicity (Andersen and Hansen 2007) – can be achieved through 
regular media reports, live streaming or TV broadcasting of discussions, or an interactive 
website attached to the constitutional deliberative practice.  
Output legitimacy refers to what happens with the result of deliberation. The 
implementation strategy is established beforehand and thus participants know if their 
decisions are binding, submitted to a referendum for approval or play a consultative function 
for an institution. In the particular case of constitutional deliberations, it is important the 
extent to which the changes suggested during deliberations are transformed into policy 
outcomes. Accordingly, two dimensions of output legitimacy evaluation are the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of the deliberative procedure. Effectiveness assesses the extent to which the 
problems signaled initially were solved through the deliberative procedure (Gastil and Levine 
2005; Geissel 2013). Efficiency weighs the costs of deliberation against its benefits: a 
deliberative practice is considered efficient if it bears higher benefits than the costs for people 
and institutions (Smith 2009).  
This extensive body of research reveals the existence of basic standards to be met in 
each of the input, throughput, and output phases of legitimacy. Using these dimensions and 
indicators the empirical section of this paper shows the various types of legitimacy achieved by 
the Constitutional Forum in Romania. The analysis will present both the design (what was 
planned before deliberation) and what happened in practice. Before the analysis, it is useful to 
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understand the context in which this deliberative practice emerged. The following section 
provides a brief summary of the recent political developments leading to constitutional change 
and sheds light on the reasons behind citizen involvement.  
 
The Context of Constitutional Reform in 2013 
The debate around constitutional revision in Romania was not over after the 2003 
amendments and remained on the political agenda, although not in pole position. The 
arguments to justify a comprehensive constitutional reform have been often outlined in public 
discourses over the last decade. The state has to be reformed in order to better govern society. 
But society does not withhold, at its turn, the discontent towards the manner in which 
politicians mean the “state”. And, consequently, the demands for a more precise definition and 
application of rights and liberties, and of citizen control over institutions, manifest in parallel. 
Meanwhile, the political conflicts of the recent period (two votes of no confidence in one term 
– in October 2009 and in April 2012, two impeachments of the President – in April 2007 and in 
July 2012, the “making” of majority beyond the result of the scrutiny etc.) revealed the 
necessity for change. Moreover, the effects of the economic crisis have heightened the 
consequences of various sized, but repeatedly produced, political crises. In brief, despite its 
detailed provisions, the Constitution was sometimes ambiguous about the roles of state 
institutions (Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013) and, as a result, was subject to countless 
interpretations each time political tensions arise. Without addressing the causes of the 
problems, these will not vanish but persist.  
In light of these developments, a relative consensus regarding the necessity for 
constitutional change emerged at the level of political elite. After the presidential elections of 
2009 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, the constitutional revision moved up from the 
stage of intention to that of action. In a first phase, the president of the country initiated two 
referendums – held simultaneously with the 2009 presidential elections – aimed at reforming 
the structure of Parliament. With the background of the 2007 impeachment attempt and the 
repeated discourse about state modernization (Vesalon 2011), this initiative was not surprising. 
A second phase was represented by the formation of a new parliamentary majority in 2011 that 
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determined the country president to nominate a prime-minister from its ranks at the 
beginning of 2012. The political alliance between the social-democrats (PSD), liberals (PNL) 
and conservatives (PC) – called the Social-Liberal Union (USL) – passed two votes of no 
confidence against the governments supported by the party of the country president in 
February and April 2012. In its attempt to gain control over state institutions the new 
parliamentary majority forced changes at the limit of the constitution (Gherghina and Soare 
2015) and initiated an impeachment procedure against the president. The allegations referred 
to violations of the constitution, interferences in government affairs, the violation of the 
neutrality of justice, the breaking of the separation of powers principle, and overstepping his 
prerogatives in relation to the legislative. After the failure of the referendum called to validate 
the impeachment procedure the USL leaders have sought about changing the constitution to 
avoid future institutional conflicts in general and to diminish the personalization of power in 
the case of the country president in particular. This plan has been facilitated by their landslide 
victory in the 2012 legislative elections – less than half a year after the impeachment procedure 
– and the existence at the beginning of the 2012-2016 legislative term of a parliamentary
majority able to undertake constitutional changes, i.e. more than two thirds of the legislature.4 
The decision to involve citizens in the process of constitutional revision was determined 
by two reasons. The first was the willingness of the civil society to get involved in the 
constitutional reform. Building on the experience and relative success of the Constitutional 
Forum organized before the 2003 change, representatives of the Pro Democracy Association 
argued in favor of popular involvement. Their position reflected both the normative 
components presented in the theoretical section of this paper (e.g. subjects should be able to 
decide upon the fundamental act influencing their lives or improving the quality of decision-
making) and instrumental arguments. For example, since any new Constitution must be 
approved by a binding popular referendum, people have to be informed about its content. In 
this sense, public debates and deliberation can be informative. The second reason behind the 
deliberative practice was related to the USL popularity throughout the entire year 2012. 
4 For the first time after 1990, a political alliance secured more than two thirds of parliamentary seats (in both 
Chambers of Parliament), a majority that allows constitutional revision. 
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Although unsuccessful in the attempt to remove the country president from office5, the USL 
mobilized an important share of the electorate to vote in referendum. The success in the local 
(summer) and legislative elections (winter) confirmed the broad electoral support. To illustrate 
responsiveness to popular desires, the USL leaders took the decision to initiate public debates 
in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections. As a result of these factors, the political elites 
decided to have a process of constitution change in Parliament based on proposals from 
citizens. The latter were expected to meet and debate in an organized framework (the 
Constitutional Forum) and all their proposals were voted on by the Parliamentary Committee 
in charge with the revision.  
 
The Creation and Functioning of the Forum 
The crowd-sourcing of constitutional change in Romania had an a priori well-defined status: 
deliberations were aimed to produce proposals that were later submitted for approval to a 
parliamentary committee. Thus, the final word belonged to political parties in Parliament 
where the Forum had a strong supporter in the government coalition (the Liberals). 
Accordingly, the role of the deliberative body was not to draft a constitutional revision, but to 
gather proposals from civil society organizations and citizens, and to prepare an exhaustive 
report that served as basis for the work of the parliamentary committee. The parliamentary 
committee was supposed to vote one by one the amendments and to complete them with 
those coming from the members of Parliament (MPs). The final draft had to be adopted by the 
committee, by the Parliament (with a qualified majority of two thirds) and finally to be 
submitted to the popular referendum. 
The Romanian Parliament started in early 2013 the procedure to revise the Constitution 
and followed the plan by establishing the deliberative body and the parliamentary committee. 
In its first meeting, the Joint Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the 
drafting of the revision Bill of the Constitution of Romania voted to set up the Constitutional 
Forum as an autonomous and consultative structure, meant to organize debates and 
consultations with society members regarding the revision of the Romanian Constitution. 
                                                          
5 The referendum failed due to insufficient turnout (46.24%). Out of the total number of citizens who cast a valid 
vote, almost 90% said ”yes” to impeachment.  
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Complementary, it set up a parliamentary committee with the task to discuss proposals 
emerged from the deliberative practices of the forum. The president of this committee was 
one of the two USL leaders, Crin Antonescu, also president of the PNL and of the Senate. 
While the parliamentary committee and the Forum were supposed to act together towards the 
achievement of a common goal, i.e. constitutional revision, the first signs of disagreement 
appeared soon after. The Forum coordination team asked for minimum six months to deliver a 
report and the parliamentary committee decided to grant them only two and half months, 
including the public consultations and proceedings’ synthesis (February-May 2013). The main 
consequence of this precipitation was the insufficient time to prepare some of the public 
debates and to draft a perfectly coherent and consistent final report. 
The Pro Democracy coordinated the Forum for two reasons: 1) its honorary president 
(Cristian Pîrvulescu), political scientist and civic activist, has notoriety among political leaders, 
academics, journalists and members of the wider society and 2) it has an extensive network of 
local organizations all over Romania, being the only NGO able to organize representative 
debates on constitutional reform at a national level. The latter feature was very important 
because debates were supposed to be organized throughout the country. In spite of the limited 
time frame, the idea of local level debates was extensively implemented in practice: more than 
50 debates were organized at local level in March-May 2013 where more than 1,200 people 
participated (Pro Democracy Association 2013).  
Referring to the substantive part of the deliberative process, there are several key 
differences between the list of proposals resulted from the Constitutional Forum and the final 
project of Constitutional revision adopted by the Parliament. First, in terms of ideology, the 
MPs were more conservative than the participants in the Constitutional Forum. More precisely, 
they limited the amendments related to the extension of the notion of discrimination 
(especially to sexual minorities), refused to include strict and explicit provisions concerning the 
separation of the state and the church, and to allow marriage for same-sex couples. Second, in 
terms of social rights, the MPs were closer to classical liberalism then the participants in 
deliberation. For example, they denied the opposable right to have a home, refused to 
introduce the Children’s Ombudsman, and maintained the limited constitutional provisions 
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regarding employment and health guarantees. Finally, the Parliament was oriented more 
towards the vertical division of power between executive and legislative than ordinary citizens 
were during deliberation. For example, the direct election of the President was maintained and 
the active and decisive role of the President in the nomination of the Prime Minister was not 
amended significantly. 
 
Assessing the Legitimacy of the Constitutional Forum 
Let us now turn to the legitimacy dimensions of this deliberative practice. Table 1 summarizes 
the qualitative assessments in this section and provides an overview of the characteristics to be 
further discussed. Each of the following sub-sections analyzes the way in which the features of 
the Forum match each type of legitimacy from the first column. The detailed descriptions will 
also nuance the qualifications of achievements presented in the third column as a dichotomous 
variable (achievement vs. non-achievement). 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Output Assessments for the Constitutional Forum 
Types of Legitimacy Features of the Constitutional Forum Achieved 
Input   
Agenda mandate Extensive, no limits to changes Yes 
Inclusive representation Oriented towards civil society organizations, open to 
experts and interested citizens (no representative sample)  
Partial 
Throughput   
Inclusive participation Extensive opportunity to participate (including an online 
platform), equal voice 
Yes 
Transparency Transparent procedures, clear structure of debates Yes 
Output   
Effectiveness Solutions were provided but not made it into policy No 
Efficiency Hard to assess in the absence of benefits No 
 
Input Legitimacy:  
According to the theoretical framework presented in the previous section the two dimensions 
used to assess the input legitimacy of the constitutional deliberative practice in Romania are 
the mandate (how much participants could change) and the nature of representation (how 
inclusive was the selection of participants). To begin with the agenda-setting powers there 
were no formal obstacles regarding the constitutional articles that could be discussed by 
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participants. They were free to debate and propose changes on every article of the existing 
constitution (valid since 2003) with the exception of those provisions that cannot be modified 
by anyone. These are stipulated by Art. 152 of the Constitution and include the national, 
independent, unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian state, the republic as form of 
government, the territorial integrity, independence of justice, political pluralism, and the 
official language of the country. One indicator of the freedom enjoyed by participants in 
suggesting revisions is that some of these proposals were not constitutional. More precisely, 
some changes emerged during the Forum and approved by the parliamentary committee were 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.  
 In terms of composition, the Forum aimed to have large participation. However, it did 
not provide equal access to a representative sample of citizens but was organized to allow 
access of academic and professional experts in law, political science or economy and of 
representatives from NGOs, professional associations, media, trade unions and local 
government. The selection of participants was not random but rather open and exhaustive. 
Invitations were sent to all the NGOs registered in the official register, to all the members of 
the departments of political science, sociology and law from the local universities, and to all 
journalists dealing with domestic politics. In addition, each local organizing committee had the 
full liberty to invite the most relevant actors that belonged to the above-mentioned 
categories.6 Politicians were not invited to deliberation as they has anyway the last word via 
parliamentary debates. This extensive cohort of experts, journalists and civil society 
representatives was complemented by citizens interested in constitution revision. The debates 
took place in local communities selected on the basis of opportunity and availability criteria in 
such a way that both large cities and smaller towns were covered, and all historical regions 
were represented. 
The Forum had three dimensions: territorial, thematic and academic. On the territorial 
axis, the local organizing committee invited the specialists in the field of regionalization, local 
administration and territorial reform. The academic axis was exclusively composed of scholars 
                                                          
6 To provide a comparative framework for the debates hosted by the Forum, constitutional experts from 
Germany, Italy and Canada were invited to attend a number of meetings, while in May (towards the end of the 
Forum) a conclusive debate was organized with the participation of experts from the Venice Commission. 
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and students and targeted general issues regarding the constitutional review. The thematic 
axes triggered particular aspects of the constitutional reform that were of local, regional or 
sectorial interest. For example, a panel on minority issues was organized in Targu Mures (a 
mid-sized city in Transylvania), where the Hungarian ethnic minority is almost half of the city’s 
population. In the final report, there was a balance in terms of number of recommendation 
from each of the three tracks. 
In brief, the constitutional deliberation in Romania had a medium level of input 
legitimacy that was achieved through extensive agenda-setting mandate and partial inclusive 
participation. The latter was not representative for the broader citizenry (no random sampling 
was used at any stage), had an inherent self-selection bias (only interested participants joined), 
and had a limited reach in terms of grassroots participation. Instead, it aimed at including large 
segments of civically engaged citizens, i.e. academics, journalists, civil society. In this context, 
the input legitimacy benefited greatly from a consistency between the ex-ante design 
established before the actual deliberation and the practice of deliberation, i.e. the plan was 
carefully implemented with no major deviations. 
 
Throughput Legitimacy 
We look at two dimensions – equal participation opportunities and transparency – to evaluate 
the throughput legitimacy (quality of deliberation) of the constitutional deliberative forum in 
Romania. One week prior to each debate the invited participants were asked to send a filled 
form including a maximum number of three specific changes accompanied by their 
motivations. After collecting the proposals, the local Forum committee merged the 
amendments with similar topics. The structure and timing of each debate were very clear and 
communicated to participants in advance: after a 10 minutes introduction, each amendment 
was presented by its proponent in three minutes and discussed for a maximum of other 10 
minutes. As much as possible, all speakers were allowed to intervene for one minute and there 
were rare cases when participants had no possibility to finish their arguments. Each meeting 
had a moderator who made sure that at the end of debate all mentioned amendments with 
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their arguments and counter-arguments were stored and send to the central Forum 
committee. The latter merged all similar proposals and produced the final report.  
The broad range of topics debated during the Forum may be considered an indicator for 
the plurality of opinions. Some of the broad categories discussed in the context of 
constitutional revision were the: environmental issues, the statute of magistrates, the role and 
functions of the Constitutional Court, the constitutional provisions of the functions of the 
Parliament, the President and the Government, constitutional provisions on consulting and 
petition mechanisms, the role of the Ombudsman, the right of association, of protest and 
freedom of speech, national security and the role of state institutions on this matter, 
fundamental rights and liberties, European citizenship, civil society, minorities’ rights in the 
Romanian Constitution framework: equal opportunities, gender equality, minorities’ rights, the 
prerogatives of central governmental authorities in relationship with the EU, institutional 
transparency and citizens’ right to information in relationship to the authorities, social rights 
issues, the judicial, the role of social partners in the constitutional array, the right to education 
and the autonomy of universities. Throughout the debates, the importance of constitutional 
consultation and civic and democratic education was highlighted on several occasions (Pro 
Democracy Association 2013).  
To enhance transparency, publicity and virtual participation, the Forum committee 
established an online platform.7 Participation via the online platform was open to every citizen 
and the moderators did not allow bad language, personal attacks, discrimination of any kind, 
or advertisement messages. The online platform has proven quite successful since 112 topics 
related to particular constitutional revisions were initiated. In total, 316 users registered to the 
online platform and posted approximately 700 comments about the topics. The platform had 
11,000 visits (with an average of 234 visits/day) from people located in 25 countries (since the 
platform was only in Romanian, it is very likely that the vast majority of visitors were 
Romanians) (Pro Democracy Association 2013, 48-49). The debates and the online platform 
generated more than 400 proposals for constitutional revision out of which 50 referred to 
complete revision (Pro Democracy Association 2013, 9). 
                                                          
7 The platform was available at www.forumconstitutional2013.ro and could be accessed until February 2014.  
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In terms of publicity and presentation to the broader public of the discussions within 
the Forum8, the presence of journalists in deliberations increased the media coverage of the 
event. News about the topics approached in various local deliberations made it often in the 
local newspapers and sometimes in the central ones. Most of the news had an informative 
character meant to familiarize the public with the type of debates that take place. It is 
important to note that there was no ex-ante design regarding the publicity of debates. The 
organizers of the Forum did not establish a collaboration with media outlets beforehand. 
However, during deliberations several press releases were issued. 
 All these details indicate a high quality of constitutional deliberation. The transparent 
procedures were possible through the use of a moderator who kept track of proposals, ensured 
mutual respect among participants, and promoted the use of arguments in the dialogue. In the 
final report, the suggested changes were included in the order of the constitutional articles 
without any filtering. The central committee of the Forum only merged the similar proposals 
ensuring that all overlaps were eliminated and removed those suggestions that did not address 
constitutional changes. The transparency for the outer public (visibility) has been also achieved 
although there were no initial partnerships with media outlets. 
 
Output legitimacy 
As previously explained, the participants to the Romanian Constitutional Forum knew 
beforehand that their decisions will play a consultative function for the parliamentary 
committee in charge of constitutional revision. The changes suggested during deliberation had 
in a first phase a good chance to become policy outcomes. Immediately after the end of 
deliberations (May-June 2013), the parliamentary committee studied and decided about the 
suggestions: it kept some, it rejected others and added some new ones. Representatives of the 
Forum were always invited to meetings of the parliamentary committee and were asked to 
present arguments to support the suggested modifications. The discussions during such 
meetings were open and transparent although there was no real agreement between the 
                                                          
8 In this context we refer to publicity in a procedural way as means of providing transparency to deliberation. If 
publicity plays an informationa role, i.e. informing the public about the content of deliberation, then it can be seen 
as part of the output legitimacy.  
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Forum representatives and the MPs. The draft issued after these discussions included to a large 
extent the proposals originating in the debates of the Forum especially on rights and freedoms, 
child protection, checks and balances. However, in a second phase the final vote of the 
parliamentary committee weakened the result of deliberation. Several key-amendments, 
including the most progressive ones (e.g. the permission of same sex marriage) were removed. 
This shift had political causes: the PSD, with a majority in committee, feared that the 
constitutional revision could be used by Antonescu, the PNL chair of the committee, as a 
platform for his 2014 presidential candidacy. Consequently, the PSD decided to condemn the 
constitutional revision process as a whole and the subsequent step was to weaken the revision 
draft. Furthermore, after the PNL left the USL and the government coalition in April 2014 the 
entire project of constitutional revision, and implicitly the outcomes of deliberation, was 
abandoned. While this has to be, in theory, discussed by the Parliament, there is no longer the 
two thirds majority to support it and no immediate incentive to adopt and submit to public 
referendum.  
In light of these developments the effectiveness of the deliberative procedure relative 
to the final policy outcome is very low. While the debates addressed the problems of the 
current constitution, the solutions provided did not make it further than the drawers of the 
parliamentary committee in charge with revision. Nevertheless, if we account for effectiveness 
relative to the output of deliberation, the conclusion is significantly nuanced. The existence of 
an extensive report summarizing the key problems addressed during the Forum and the 
pursuit of deliberation arguments in front of the MPs are relevant outcomes. Even if the 
discussion about constitutional revision has been postponed for the moment, the documented 
solutions from deliberation can serve as a solid basis for the time when the initiative will be 
picked up again.  
With respect to the second dimension of output legitimacy, the interruption of the 
process made difficult to assess efficiency because there are no benefits to be weighed against 
the costs. The latter can be divided into several categories. First, there were organizational 
costs for the organizers of the deliberation process. The NGO in charge with the debates (Pro 
Democracy) made extensive use of resources and mobilized its territorial branches, partner 
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NGOs, academics, and journalists in the attempt to have a meaningful debate. The 
recruitment of participants required extensive resources even though it did not take the form 
of a representative mini-public. The set-up and maintenance of the online platform is another 
cost that cannot be neglected on the side of organizers. Pro Democracy financed this project 
through a wide range of partnerships with donor organization and key actors interested in 
supporting the development of democracy. The main partners were the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, which financed more than half of the regional meetings of the Forum, the Soros 
Foundation and the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society, as well as a limited 
number of business donors (private enterprises and holdings). Second, all participants had 
resource related costs since debates and discussions did not take place always during the 
week-end and most of them had to leave work to participate. There was preparation involved 
(see the previous discussion about the items they had to send beforehand) and thus all 
participants were engaged in the deliberation process for a longer period of time. Third, there 
were costs for the involved political actors. On the one hand, the PNL as main political 
supporter of the constitutional deliberation, pushed the topic on the political agenda and thus 
ignored other issues. In doing so, it played the card of crowd sourced revision to illustrate its 
openness to the voices of citizens. This approach was likely to form the basis for the 
presidential campaign of its candidate in the presidential elections at the end of 2014. When 
they left the coalition government, this important point for them was removed from the 
agenda by the PSD; accordingly, they were left without one of their main campaign tools.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the Constitutional Forum in Romania as an example of deliberative 
practice and assessed its legitimacy according to several indicators presented in the literature. 
Our qualitative analysis revealed the existence of input legitimacy due to a high power of 
agenda setting and an open representation of participants. Unlike many deliberative practices 
that try to have a mini-public representative for the broader society, the Forum in Romania 
focused on representatives of the civil society, experts, and journalists. These three categories 
were complemented by ordinary citizens who joined the deliberative body due to their interest 
19 
in the topic. The throughput legitimacy was ensured through extensive possibilities to 
participate (both in local and online debates) and equal access to voice for all participants. The 
increased transparency of the deliberative process and publicity to create the linkage with the 
outside world complete the image of a legitimate process. However, our study also revealed 
that the output legitimacy was low due to interruption of the process. Being a top-down 
initiated revision, the deliberation had only a consultative purpose and the political factor 
decisively influenced the outcome. Political quarrels between initiators and the approaching 
presidential elections put the project of constitutional revision on hold and postponed the 
implementation of deliberation.  
 The main findings validate some of the points highlighted in earlier research that 
indicated the existence of trade-offs between the three dimensions of legitimacy: input, 
throughput, and output. This high number of obstacles and challenges makes it difficult for a 
deliberative process to achieve all of them. The developments observed in the Romanian case 
are in line with this observation. The relatively high degree of input legitimacy characterized by 
extensive agenda-setting and open participation contributed to the quality of deliberation 
(throughput legitimacy). At the same time, none of these two dimensions could not guarantee 
the effectiveness and efficiency of results (output legitimacy). The latter failed to reach 
legitimacy because other important factors were involved, i.e. the political one. The influence 
of political actors on the outcome was definitive and overshadowed a well-designed and 
relatively well implemented deliberative practice. In this sense, the Romanian experience 
reinforces existing research about the consultative role of deliberations by providing a 
compelling example.  
While we agree with Blokker (2014) that the recourse to the people served an 
instrumental purpose, our findings reveal that in Romania the process was real with respect to 
deliberation. The input and throughput legitimacy of the deliberative Constitutional Forum 
show how citizens, subjects of the constitution, were actively and effectively involved in the 
problem identification and solving process. Since the scope of deliberation was limited, their 
say on the final decision – taken on political grounds – can hardly be assessed. The widespread 
public debate around the constitution revision has been unprecedented in any domain of civic 
20 
involvement in Romania. The large participation and extensive interest shown by civil society, 
academics, journalists, and ordinary citizens indicate the feasibility of this alternative to 
decision-making led by institutions of representative democracy. Under the circumstances 
presented in the paper, the legitimacy of deliberation got lower where non-deliberative factors 
intervened.  
Further research can go in this direction and investigate the extent to which the 
political factor negatively influenced the effectiveness and efficiency of deliberation. Our 
analysis was limited to the assessment of output legitimacy and did not delve into what 
happened after the proposals of the Forum were abandoned. The absence of transparency and 
publicity in the post-deliberation phase can represent a possible explanation for the failure to 
implement the deliberative outcome. Another avenue for research can be an in-depth 
examination of the types of legitimacy. The picture presented in the paper has been painted 
with broad strokes and a closer look may reveal important details. For example, information 
may be an important component of both input and throughput legitimacy. Earlier studies on 
deliberative practices have shown that the knowledge participants possess and how this 
knowledge changes through deliberation can play a crucial role in the outcome. Initial levels of 
information are reflected in the questionnaires filled by many participants to the Constitutional 
Forum, while changes in information can be captured through qualitative interviews with 
participants. Moreover, comparative research can try to draw lines between the Romanian 
constitutional deliberation and similar cases in Europe (e.g. Iceland, Ireland, or Hungary) that 
display a similar intertwining of the crowdsourced legislation and politics. 
21 
List of references: 
Ackerman, Bruce. 1993. We the People, Volume 1: Foundations. Reprint ed. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press. 
Albi, Anneli. 2005. EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Andersen, Vibeke Normann, and Kasper M. Hansen. 2007. “How Deliberation Makes Better 
Citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the Euro.” European Journal of Political Research 
46 (4): 531–56. 
Bădescu, Gabriel, Paul Sum, and Eric M. Uslaner. 2004. “Civil Society Development and 
Democratic Values in Romania and Moldova.” East European Politics and Societies 18 (2): 
316–41.  
Burean, Toma, and Gabriel Badescu. 2014. “Voices of Discontent: Student Protest 
Participation in Romania.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (3-4): 385–97.  
Blokker, Paul. 2014. "Constitutional reform in Europe and recourse to the people". Paper 
prepared for the IXth World Congress "Constitutional Challenges: Global and Local", The 
International Association of Constitutional Law, Oslo, 16-20 June. 
Caluwaerts, Didier, and Min Reuchamps. 2015. “Strengthening Democracy through Bottom-up 
Deliberation: An Assessment of the Internal Legitimacy of the G1000 Project.” Acta 
Politica 50 (1): 151–70. 
Carey, Henry F. 2004. Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society. Lanham: Lexington 
Books. 
Chambers, Simone. 2003. “Deliberative Democratic Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 
6: 307–26. 
Dryzek, John S. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2001. “Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy.” Political Theory 29 (5): 
651–69. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1995. “Constitutionalism and Democracy.” European Journal of Philosophy 3 
(1): 2–11. 
22 
Elster, Jon. 1991. “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction.” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 58 (2): 447–82. 
———. 1993. “Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea.” 
Public Administration 71 (1-2): 169–217. 
Fillmore-Patrick, Hannah. 2013. "The Iceland Experiment (2009-2013): A Participatory 
Approach to Constitutional Reform", DPC Policy Note, no. 2. 
Fossum, John Erik, and Agustin Jose Menendez. 2005. “The Constitution’s Gift? A Deliberative 
Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union.” European Law 
Journal 11 (4): 380–410. 
Freeman, Samuel. 1990. “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review.” 
Law and Philosophy 9 (4): 327–70. 
Gastil, John, and Peter Levine, eds. 2005. The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for 
Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Geissel, Brigitte. 2013. “Introduction: On the Evaluation of Participatory Innovations – A 
Preliminary Framework.” In Participatory Democratic Innovations in Europe. Improving the 
Quality of Democracy, edited by Brigitte Geissel and Marko Joas, 8–31. Opladen: Barbara 
Budrich. 
Gherghina, Sergiu, and Sergiu Miscoiu. 2013. “The Failure of Cohabitation: Explaining the 2007 
and 2012 Institutional Crises in Romania.” East European Politics & Societies 27 (4): 668–84. 
Gherghina, Sergiu, and Sorina Soare. 2015. " A Test of the EU Post-Accession Influence: 
Comparing Reactions to Political Instability in Romania." Democratization (forthcoming).  
Ginsburg, Tom, and Rosalind Dixon, eds. 2011. Comparative Constitutional Law. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Goodin, Robert E. 2000. “Democratic Deliberation Within.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (1): 
81–109. 
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1998. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press. 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
23 
———. 2001. “Constitutitonal Democracy, A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” 
Political Theory 29 (6): 766–81. 
Howard, Marc Morje. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kellermann, Alfred E., Jaap W. de Zwaan, and Jeno Czuczai, eds. 2001. EU Enlargement: The 
Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level. The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press. 
Landemore, Helene. 2013. "Inclusive Constitution-Making: Epistemic Considerations. on the 
Icelandic Experiment". Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference, 
Bordeaux. 
Nicholson of Winterbourne, Emma. 2006. “Civil Society and the Media in Romania.” In The EU 
and Romania. Accession and Beyond, edited by David Phinnemore. London: Federal Trust 
for Education and Research. 
Olafson, Jon. 2011. "An Experiment in Iceland: Crowdsourcing a Constitution". Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Parau, Cristina Elena. 2009. “Impaling Dracula: How EU Accession Empowered Civil Society in 
Romania.” West European Politics 32 (1): 119–41.  
Pogany, Istvan. 1993. “Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary’s 
Transition to Democracy.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (2). Cambridge 
University Press: 332–55. 
Pro Democracy Association. 2013. “Raportul Forumului Constitutional 2013” (The Report of the 
Constitutional Forum), available at  
www.variantacojocaru.ro/ConstitutiaPoporului/Raport_FC.28.05.13.pdf, last accessed 24 
July 2014. 
Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Scharpf, Fritz. 1999. Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2013. “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput.’” Political Studies 61 (1): 2–22. 
24 
Smith, Graham. 2009. Democratic Innovations. Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Suiter, Jane, and Min Reuchamps. 2015. “The Constitutional Turn in Deliberative Democracy in 
Europe.” In Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, edited by Min Reuchamps and 
Jane Suiter. Colchester: ECPR Press (forthcoming). 
Talpin, Julien. 2012. “When Democratic Innovations Let the People Decide. An Evaluation of 
Co-Governance Experiments.” In Evaluating Democratic Innovations: Curing the 
Democratic Malaise?, edited by Brigitte Geissel and Kenneth Newton, 184–206. London: 
Routledge. 
Thomas, George. 2008. “Popular Constitutionalism: The New Living Constitutionalism.” In 
Constitutional Politics in a Conservative Era, edited by Austin Sarat, 73–105. Bingley: 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Vesalon, Lucian. 2012. “State Modernization as a Neoliberal Populist Discourse in Romania”, 
DISC Working Paper Series, no. 22. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
